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ABSTRACT 
Our results show that high-income families place significantly higher value on academic 
achievement than low-income families. High-income families are also more likely to 
penalize house price for non-desirable non-academic school quality. This paper uses 
quantile regression to examine the distribution of demand for school quality. For 
academic achievement, the average effects as estimated by OLS are biased toward zero 
due to “aggregation” of families’ willingness to pay. We take advantage of a court-
ordered redistricting as a quasi-random assignment of school quality. Subdivision and 
school fixed-effects are used to control for unobserved characteristics. 
 
 
Roy Wada 
UCLA School of Public Health 
Box 951772 
Los Angeles, California 90095-1772 
roywada@ucla.edu 
 
Velma Zahirovic-Herbert 
Department of Housing and Consumer Economics 
University of Georgia 
111 Dawson Hall 
Athens, GA 30602-3622 
vherbert@uga.edu 
 
 3
I. INTRODUCTION 
School choice programs are expected to improve access to academically superior 
schools and reduce educational inequality. An important underlying assumption is that 
parents choose schools based on academic achievement. Critics of school choice 
programs, however, argue that low-income families are more likely to make their 
decisions based on non-academic criteria.1 If low-income families have significantly less 
demand for academic achievement, then school choice programs may not be as effective 
in improving school quality or education equity. 
This paper uses quantile regression to examine the distribution of parents’ 
demand for school quality with respect to family income. The existing economic 
literature is mixed on parents’ reactions to qualitative rankings of school performance.2 
According to Schneider and Buckley (2002), survey-based studies indicate the demand 
for academic achievement is stronger among low-income families, but these studies have 
been criticized for not being based on actual behavior. A recent study using parental 
ranking of teachers by Jacob and Lefgren (2007) found that low-income families rank 
academic achievement higher than student satisfaction, while the reverse is true for high-
income families. This finding is in contract from another recent study based on a school 
choice experiment by Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2005), who found the demand for 
academic achievement increases with family income.  
Economists have traditionally used housing market data to examine the demand 
for school quality. In a pioneering study, Black (1999) showed that one standard 
deviation rise in test scores is worth about a 2 percent increase in house price. Haurin and 
Brasington (1996) find positive relationships between standardized test scores and house 
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prices. These studies have generally found that parents are willing to pay more for 
superior academic achievement (e.g. Haurin and Brasington, 1996; Black, 1999; Figlio 
and Lucas, 2004). The distribution of willingness to pay, however, has not been closely 
examined. 
An effective method for examining the distribution of demand is quantile 
regression. Quantile regression allows the estimated coefficients to vary along the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable. Hence, it can be used to investigate 
distributional or equity aspects of outcomes. It is used in this paper to examine the 
distribution of demand for school quality. According to findings by Jacob and Lefgren 
(2007), examining across the distribution is important because the average effects can 
hide significant heterogeneity in parents’ demand for school quality. This study also takes 
advantage of a court-ordered school redistricting in Louisiana as a random assignment of 
school quality that can address the usual problems associated with potential endogeneity 
of school quality. Following Figlio (2004), school and subdivision fixed-effects are used 
to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics, including those normally 
considered as a part of spatial correlations. 
After controlling for relevant characteristics, we find that the estimated 
willingness to pay is remarkably sensitive to the distribution of house price. High-income 
families place significantly higher value on academic achievement than low-income 
families. The average effect as estimated by OLS significantly understates the demand 
for school quality due to “aggregation” of families’ willingness to pay. High-income 
families are more likely to penalize house price for non-desirable non-academic school 
qualities. These results are similar to the conclusion drawn by Hastings, Kane, and 
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Staiger (2005) who found the demand for academic achievement to be increasing with 
family income. Because parent demand for school achievement appears to be strongly 
affected by the availability of household resources, merely improving access to schools 
may not be as effective in delivering quality education to children of all backgrounds. 
 
II. Model and Estimation Strategy 
This study uses purchase history for single-unit houses in the East Baton Rouge Parish, 
Louisiana that spans a four-year period from 1999 to 2002. This area is served by the 
East Baton Rouge Parish School System, which consists of 90 schools with 
approximately 46,200 students. It is the largest school district in the state. By using the 
data from a single school system with a single city-county government structure, 
unobserved differences in property tax rates or public services can be minimized. This 
study is limited to elementary schools due to data availability. 
 
Hedonic model of house price with quantile regression 
The outcomes of interest are the purchase price of single-unit dwellings in the area. The 
marginal willingness to pay for local school quality is likely to differ across the range of 
house prices. Recent research shows that purchasers of higher-end houses value house 
characteristics, such as square footage or the number of bathrooms, differently from 
buyers of lower-end houses (Sirmans et. al., 2005).3 To investigate differences in 
willingness to pay for school quality, we examine the willingness to pay along the 
distribution of house prices at various quantiles or percentiles. To this end, quantile 
regression estimates a series of linear hedonic price equations that might look like this: 
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εϕγδβα τττττττ ++++++= FSMNHc)priceln(    (1) 
in which the natural log of house price, , is  a function of the vectors of house 
characteristics H, neighborhood characteristics N , house market conditions M, school 
characteristics S, and the fixed effects F for geographic locations, neighborhood schools, 
and year and season of sale. Locations fixed-effects control for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics. The estimated coefficients depend on the quantile or percentile,
)priceln( τ
τ , of the 
distribution of the natural log of house price.4
For hedonic price equations, quantile regression allows researchers to examine the 
marginal effects at the either ends the dependent variable without having to impose strict 
parametric assumptions associated with segmenting or partitioning data (Buchinsky, 
1994; Mata and Machado, 1996; and Koenker and Hallock, 2001).5 Unlike OLS, quantile 
regression can be employed to explain the determinants of the dependent variable at any 
point of the distribution of the dependent variable. Symmetric weights are used for the 
median (quantile = 0.5) while asymmetric weights are used for all other quantiles. We 
also use bootstrapped standard errors, which are significantly less sensitive to 
heteroskedasticity than analytic standard errors (Gould, 1992, 1997). 
 
Quasi-random experiment in school redistricting 
Our dataset is built around a quasi-random experiment in which a series of court-orders 
redistricted the Baton Rouge school system.  This redistricting resulted in random 
changes in school quality for some houses due to reassignment. The federal court initially 
ordered redistricting in 1981 for the purpose of desegregating schools in response to a 
lawsuit, Davis et al. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. It closed several schools 
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and randomly assigned students to schools with a different racial majority. This resulted 
in widespread busing of students, which proved highly unpopular and disruptive.6 In 
1996 the federal court reversed itself and ordered the reestablishment of local school 
attendance zones with less busing. This, however, led to serious overcrowding. The final 
round of redistricting was ordered in 2001 to alleviate the crisis. The last redistricting 
created a lot of uncertainty with highly divergent plans being considered until the last 
minute.7  Students from 11 schools were finally reassigned to 16 other schools in a 
rushed manner in September of the same year. 
These circumstances point to the random or unexpected nature of the redistricting 
along the dimensions of interest. We argue that the final redistricting in response to 
overcrowding can be used to reveal the relationship between house price and school 
quality because it was externally imposed by the federal court and not based on 
geographic or neighborhood proximity. This represents a quasi-random assignment of 
school quality in which some houses were unpredictably reassigned to a higher quality 
school and others to a lower quality school. Such reassignments can be used to solve the 
typical identification problems associated with regression analyses. 
 
III. Data 
Our sample consists of 7,502 house sales that occurred in the East Baton Rouge 
Parish School System between 1999 and 2002. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of 
the variables of interest. The dependent variable, house price, has a mean of just under 
$129,000 in 1999 dollars. House prices were deflated using the region-specific Consumer 
Price Index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. There are 343 subdivisions and 43 
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elementary schools in this area. An average home in our sample has 3.25 bedrooms and 2 
bathrooms. The subdivisions in this area were established anywhere from very recently to 
60 years ago, with 25 percent of houses built 20-30 years ago. Approximately 5.6 percent 
of houses were reassigned to different schools at the end of summer in 2001. To control 
for the effect of reassignment, our specification includes the interaction between the 
indicator for reassignment and various measures of school characteristics. This will 
account for the instances in which improved school quality arises from reassignment. 
 
School Attributes and School Performance 
The vectors of school characteristics S we use to measure academic quality in this 
paper include the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills given to third graders (mean of 50 and 
standard deviation of just over 12). We use percentile ranking relative to the national 
norms, which is the standard. An Iowa score of 78, for example, would mean the average 
score at the school is higher than 78 percent of students in the U.S. In addition to being 
readily available to parents, the percentile Iowa scores avoid the problem of subjectivity 
associated with qualitative rankings of school performance. 
Two other school attributes normally associated with academic school quality 
include the proportion of teachers with a master’s degree (43.3 percent) and the average 
class size (16.75 students per class). The proportion of faculty with advanced degrees is a 
part of district-determined school inputs into the education production function.8 The 
average class size is another.9 A lower student to teacher ratio may be instrumental in 
promoting student learning, especially in lower elementary grades. A comprehensive 
review by Hanushek (1986) indicates that the effect of class size reduction on 
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achievement is at best ambiguous, with various studies showing both positive and 
negative results. 
Non-academic school attributes of interest include the proportion of black 
students (62.6 percent), total number of students, the proportion of students with 
subsidized lunch (64.2 percent), and the straight-line distance from house to school (1.59 
miles).10 Regression studies have generally shown that student racial compositions and 
physical proximities to school are also important characteristics of the school 
environment (Weiher and Tedin, 2002; and Schneider and Buckley, 2002). Some 
research indicates that proximity to a school is actually a nuisance (Emerson, 1972), 
while other research indicates that proximity to a school has an impact equivalent to that 
of an increase in school test scores (Kane, et al. 2003). The distance between a residence 
and its assigned school should have important impacts on the premium homebuyers pay 
for residences that are close to good schools.11
 
House Price and Market Conditions 
Each house is geocoded to a specific elementary school and subdivision. The vector of 
house characteristics H includes the usual variables such as number of bedrooms, number 
of bathrooms, age, living area, and net area. Living area and net area are the total area 
under the roof measured in thousands of square feet. To control for the potential effects 
of spatial correlation, we follow Figlio (2004) by including subdivision fixed-effects. 
These fixed-effects also control for unobserved time-invariant location amenities. The 
physical integrity of each subdivision was verified by mapping them onto a two-
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dimensional surface. Two-way fixed-effects for four seasons and four years are also 
included to control for seasonality in house price. 
Our neighborhood housing market conditions, M, are measured in part by the 
number of competing houses that are for sale at the same time a house is on the market. 
The number of houses for sale in an area around a house can have localized effects on the 
distribution of prospective buyers and sellers. We can consider this as a part of time-
variant spatial interdependencies. A greater supply of houses for sale increases the 
competition among sellers for buyers considering houses in the neighborhood — the 
localized competition effect. Similarly, a greater number of houses for sale may draw 
more prospective buyers to the neighborhood, potentially increasing the chance of 
matching a particular house with a buyer — the shopping externality effect.  
Following Turnbull and Dombrow (2006), neighborhood market conditions are 
measured by the average number of competing listings in the neighborhood each day the 
house is on the market – listing density. This measure for each house i is calculated as 
follows: 
( )∑ +−−= 1)()( ),(),(1Density Listing
2
ilis
jiOjiD      (5) 
where the summation is taken over all houses within 20 percent larger or smaller (in 
terms of living area) that are within one mile of house i. Here, l(i) and s(i) are the listing 
date and sales date for house i, respectively, so that time-on-market is s(i)-l(i)+1. O(i,j) 
represents the overlapping marketing duration for contemporaneously listed houses i and 
j, and is defined as [ ] [ ] .1)(),(max)(),(min),( +−= jliljsisjiO  D(i,j) is the distance in 
miles between houses i and j. The calculation of this variable for each house in the data 
set includes all applicable competing house sales, including houses in areas 
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geographically neighboring our sample as well as any house listed before our sample 
period with time-on-market that overlaps with our sample period.  
 
IV. Results 
Table 2 reports estimates of the relationship between school quality measures and 
house price. All of the models include subdivision dummies and school dummies as 
neighborhood controls. Column (1) represents the baseline results using OLS. The OLS 
results for school attributes are mixed and often not significant. The various measures of 
academic school quality (the average Iowa test score, the proportion of teachers with a 
master’s degree, and the average class size) have non-significant statistical significance. 
Non-academic school qualities, on the other hand, are more likely to be statistically 
significant. House price is slightly penalized when there is an increasing percentage of 
black students and total number of students. An increase in students with subsidized 
lunch by 1 percent is expected to increase house price by 0.2 percent. The marginal effect 
of being reassignment under the court-ordered redistricting translates into a price penalty 
of about 0.5 percent and is not significant.12
Columns (2)-(6) contain the results from quantile regression at various quantile or 
percentiles across the conditional distribution of house price.13 The results from the 
quantile regression are noticeably different and make more sense than the OLS result. 
With the exception of the class size, we see a clear trend in which the effect of academic 
school quality rises with the house price. The effects of academic school qualities also 
become significant but only at the higher end of the house market. The marginal effect of 
the Iowa test score rising from -0.02 percent at the 10th percentiles to 0.07 percent at the 
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90th percentiles. The effect of Iowa test also changes from negative and not significant to 
positive and highly significant. The effect of proportion of teachers with a master’s 
degree similarly rises across the distribution of house price and become statistically 
significant. 
At the 90th percentile, one standard-deviation rise in the Iowa score (about 24 
percentage points) is worth about 0.9 percent of the house price. This is about $1100 at 
the average house price of $129,000, or about $1800 at the 90th percentile of the house 
price. The one standard-deviation effect of master’s degree is worth about 0.7 percent of 
the house price. These results are about the half of the effect estimated by Black (1999) 
for one standard deviation improvement in school quality. 
For the effect of the average Iowa test score, it is notable that the OLS coefficient 
takes a value (5.07e-05) that is located in the middle of the range of values taken by the 
quantile regression coefficients (-0.000215 to 0.000745). This suggests that the estimated 
coefficient for OLS is potentially biased downward due to the aggregation of the negative 
and positive effects at either end of the distribution. Because OLS is a conditional means 
estimator, it does not account for possibly opposing effects at either end of the house 
price distribution. 
The changes in the estimated coefficients across the percentiles or the distribution 
of house price are visibly illustrated in the collection of graphs in the Figure 1. We see 
that the estimated willingness to pay for the Iowa test score or the proportion of teachers 
with master’s degree rises across the distribution of house price. The increasing 
valuations attached to academic quality as a function of house price indicate that the 
households with higher family incomes have a significantly stronger demand for 
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academic achievement than lower-income families. In contrast, the demand for academic 
achievement at the lower end of the distribution is not significantly different from zero 
and, in fact, has a negative sign for the average Iowa test score. 
The sign for the estimated effect of the average class size is positive and 
increasing with house price. Because we already control for academic achievement 
through the inclusion of Iowa test score, and class size is an input rather than an output of 
educational process, we do not view this as evidence that academic quality lowers house 
price. As noted earlier, the effect of class size on academic achievement is a subject of 
much controversy. The positive association found in our study may be due to the fact that 
schools in the older neighborhoods with lower house prices are more likely to have 
smaller classrooms. Special education classes also tend to have a small class sizes and 
associated with significantly lower academic performance. We do not address these 
possibilities due to the lack of data. 
The results for the non-academic school qualities indicate that high-income 
families are also more likely to penalize house price for the presence of non-desirable 
non-academic qualities. The marginal effect of distance to school and the school size as 
measured by the student population is negative. The effect is significantly larger at the 
upper end of the distribution. The presence of black students and the students receiving 
subsidized lunch may or may not be negative in these neighborhoods considering that the 
average proportion of black students is 62 percent and the students receiving subsidized 
lunch is 64 percent. The estimated effect of proportion of black students is negative but 
they tend to move around without a clear trend across the distribution of house price, 
which suggests the housing market directly discounts schools based on race but not 
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necessarily associated due to income differences. The coefficient on proportion of 
students with subsidized lunch, however, is positive and significant in both OLS and 
quantile estimations. This further suggests that house price is not systematically 
influenced by socioeconomic integration. We also draw attention to the fact that the state 
of Louisiana focuses a large share of financial rewards on schools that meet or exceed 
achievement growth targets, including students who are placed on school lunch subsidies. 
After controlling for school fixed effects, we cannot ascertain whether the housing 
market shares state policymakers’ enthusiasm for these measures or that the housing 
market values the incremental state resources for schools with improved performance.  
Note that the coefficient estimates on physical house characteristics are all 
reasonable and very robust across the specifications. This finding is supportive of the idea 
that omitted housing attributes do not vary systematically across neighborhoods. If 
omitted attributes varied systematically across subdivisions, the attributes would likely be 
correlated with observed variables, like square footage and number of bedrooms, and 
therefore cause bias in the cross-sectional estimated coefficients for those variables. We 
do not discuss coefficients on physical house characteristics as they are not the focus of 
our study. 
 
Robustness Check
One way to control for omitted variables is to use a repeat sales model that 
differences out constant factors. There are 274 repeat sales in our sample where a house 
was sold before and after the court-assigned redistricting.14 This represents a unique 
sample in which the reassigned school represents a quasi-random change in school 
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characteristics for the same set of houses. Although the sample size is not large enough to 
run a full specification, it can be used to validate our earlier findings. The results of the 
long-differenced model with a limited specification using the 274 repeat sales are 
presented in Table 3. None of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, but 
we are able to observe a similar trend across OLS and various percentiles of quantile 
regression. The OLS specification in Column 1 takes a value that is between the 
estimated coefficients for the 25th and 50th percentiles for quantile regressions. This 
result reinforces our earlier finding from the full specification in which the estimated 
effect of Iowa test score is apparently cancelled out due to the “aggregation” of the 
estimated coefficients. 
Although it is not estimated with sufficient precision, the estimated effect of Iowa 
test score at the 90th percentile is about three times larger than the non-differenced results 
from Table 2. The rest of school characteristics in Table 3 generally have the same signs 
but do not appear to trend towards being smaller or larger in magnitude than the non-
differenced estimations in Table 2.  
 
V. Conclusion 
A majority of empirical studies on the parent demand for school quality have 
examined the average behavior. In this paper we use quantile regression to estimate the 
marginal effect of a school with superior academic achievement at different points in the 
distribution of house price. The uniqueness of the Baton Rouge experience enables us to 
deal effectively with a number of issues of concern in the housing literature. First, we 
found a trend in which the demand for quality school increases significantly with family 
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resources. This is not unexpected given the fact that quality is generally considered to be 
a normal good. Although not statistically significant, the negative effect of the Iowa test 
score towards the lower end of the housing market suggests reduced demand for 
education quality. Combined with a general downward trend towards the lower end, it 
indicates significantly reduced willingness to pay for academic school quality by families 
with limited resources. 
Second, we found that for the Iowa test score and the proportion of teachers with 
a master’s degree, the result for OLS takes roughly the middle value between the extreme 
ends of distribution from the quantile regression. This suggests that OLS results are 
biased towards zero due to “aggregation” of the estimated demand from either end of the 
house price distribution. Because OLS is a conditional means estimator, it is unable to 
account for changes in the willingness to pay across the distribution of house price. The 
“aggregation” bias is therefore a potential factor in mixed results previously reported by 
other empirical studies. 
Third, the estimated demands for school quality are not especially large even 
among the relatively well-off families. One standard deviation rise in the average Iowa 
test score is worth about 0.9 percent of the house price. Considering that the willingness 
to pay becomes negligible towards the middle of the distribution and negative thereafter, 
the estimated willingness to pay appears to be small. 
Fourth, high-income families are more likely to penalize house price for having 
non-desirable non-academic school qualities such as increased distance to school or 
larger school size. The presence of subsidized school lunch appears to be valued more by 
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the lower-income families, perhaps indicating a more supportive atmosphere for the 
families of limited means. 
These results generally paint a picture in which only high-income families have a 
strong demand for school quality. Low-income families with limited resources appear to 
be significantly less willing to pay for academic achievement. Our findings provide 
evidence in support of the argument that school choice programs may not deliver 
significantly improved education quality and equity. The expanded educational choice 
may in fact lead to a situation where parents will use the improved access to education to 
self-segregate into groups. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev 
   
Academic school quality:   
Average Iowa Test Percentile 50.31 12.38 
Proportion of teachers with master's degree 43.33 8.502 
Average class size 16.75 4.802 
   
Non-academic school quality:   
Total number of students 466.5 118 
Distance to school (miles) 1.590 1.616 
Proportion of black students 0.622 0.199 
Proportion of students with subsidized lunch 0.642 0.173 
Reassigned 0.057 0.231 
   
House attributes:   
House price sold (1999 dollars) 129,000 53,858 
Log of house price sold (1999 dollars) 11.69 0.395 
Number of days on the market 68.50 44.48 
Number of fire place 0.716 0.507 
Number of bedrooms 3.250 0.619 
Number of bathrooms 2.036 0.478 
Living area (thousands of sq. feet) 1.879 0.541 
Non-living area (thousands of sq. feet) 0.677 0.278 
1-3 years old 0.0561 0.23 
4-5 years old 0.0479 0.213 
6-10 years old 0.0882 0.284 
11-15 years old 0.0833 0.276 
16-20 years old 0.136 0.343 
20-30 years old 0.257 0.437 
31-40 years old 0.154 0.361 
41-50 years old 0.0805 0.272 
   
Local market conditions:   
Listing Density 3.810 2.385 
Vacant 124.2 73.54 
Indicator for year 2000 0.192 0.394 
Indicator for year 2001 0.229 0.42 
Indicator for year 2002 0.201 0.401 
Spring 0.287 0.452 
Summer 0.270 0.444 
Fall 0.219 0.413 
   
Number of schools 43  
Number of subdivisions 433  
Number of observations 7502  
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Table 2 
OLS and Quantile Estimation of House Price 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Natural Log of House Price (1999 dollar) OLS 
Quantile 
0.10 
Quantile 
0.25 
Quantile 
0.50 
Quantile 
0.75 
Quantile 
0.90 
       
Academic school quality:       
Average Iowa Test Percentile 5.07e-05 -0.000215 9.12e-05 6.80e-05 0.000357 0.000745** 
 (0.000282) (0.000423) (0.0368) (0.000298) (0.000267) (0.000376) 
Proportion of teachers with master's degree 0.000242 0.000166 0.000144 0.000203 0.000511 0.000822* 
 (0.000303) (0.000437) (0.0347) (0.000329) (0.000311) (0.000434) 
Average class size 0.000589 7.09e-05 -0.000743 0.000386 0.00126** 0.000984 
 (0.000555) (0.000845) (0.0147) (0.000489) (0.000527) (0.000683) 
       
Non-academic school quality:       
Total number of students -8.21e-05* 1.51e-05 -1.50e-06 -3.74e-05 -5.46e-05 -6.47e-05 
 (4.53e-05) (8.13e-05) (0.0171) (4.31e-05) (4.29e-05) (5.54e-05) 
Distance to school (miles) -0.0106 -0.00426 -0.000907 -0.00292 -0.00692 -0.00781 
 (0.00706) (0.0143) (1.370) (0.00733) (0.00798) (0.0127) 
Proportion of black students -0.0798* -0.0782 -0.122 -0.0942** -0.0340 -0.00574 
 (0.0480) (0.0806) (16.02) (0.0429) (0.0487) (0.0605) 
Proportion of students with subsidized lunch 0.226*** 0.225*** 0.299 0.240*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
 (0.0535) (0.0861) (17.84) (0.0470) (0.0536) (0.0670) 
Marginal effect of school reassignment+ -0.00495 -0.0262 -0.0203    -0.0044  -0.0077    0.0217 
 (0.0215) (0.0458) (6.497) (0.0266) (0.0292) (0.0412) 
       
House attributes:       
Number of days on the market -0.000186*** -0.000161*** -0.000185 -0.000155*** -0.00017*** -0.000158*** 
 (3.00e-05) (5.25e-05) (0.00114) (3.26e-05) (2.98e-05) (4.33e-05) 
Number of fire place 0.0202*** 0.0135** 0.0140 0.0156*** 0.0129*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00533) (0.267) (0.00332) (0.00371) (0.00456) 
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Number of bedrooms 0.0142*** 0.0329*** 0.0195 0.0112** 0.00301 -0.00503 
 (0.00329) (0.00529) (0.718) (0.00442) (0.00455) (0.00520) 
Number of bathrooms 0.0211*** 0.0261*** 0.0209 0.0220*** 0.0194*** 0.0133** 
 (0.00392) (0.00667) (0.934) (0.00394) (0.00471) (0.00524) 
Living area (thousands of sq. feet) 0.318*** 0.267*** 0.299 0.320*** 0.351*** 0.392*** 
 (0.00499) (0.0115) (0.581) (0.00779) (0.00760) (0.0111) 
Non-living area (thousands of sq. feet) 0.0998*** 0.104*** 0.0876 0.0740*** 0.0671*** 0.0705*** 
 (0.00580) (0.0113) (0.609) (0.00632) (0.00653) (0.00920) 
       
Local market conditions:       
Listing Density 0.000324 0.00183* 0.000528 -3.80e-05 -0.000979 -0.00216*** 
 (0.000834) (0.00104) (0.139) (0.000764) (0.000713) (0.000825) 
Vacant 0.000179* 0.000420 -0.000132 -5.00e-06 7.38e-05 0.000115 
 (0.000103) (0.000332) (0.0172) (0.000253) (0.000269) (0.000262) 
       
Constant 10.26*** 9.849*** 10.09 10.31*** 10.14*** 10.88*** 
 (0.231) (0.456) (586.9) (0.353) (0.386) (0.437) 
       
Number of observations 7502 7502 7502 7502 7502 7502 
R-square or Pseudo R-square 0.928      
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS. Bootstrapped standard errors with 99 replications for 
quantile regressions. Also controlled for 7 indicators for age of the house, 3 indicators for year, 3 indicators for seasons of sale, 42 
indicators for schools, and 432 indicators for subdivisions, and interactions terms between reassignment and various measures of 
school quality (average Iowa Test Percentile, Proportion of black students, total number of students, proportion of students with 
subsidized lunch, average class size, proportion of teachers with a master's degree, and miles to school). + The marginal effects of 
being assigned were computed as the linear combination of the coefficients and the mean for the reassignment and the interactions 
between reassignment and various measures of school quality. 
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Table 3 
Differenced OLS and Quantile Estimation of House Price using Repeat Sales 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Natural Log of House Price (1999 dollar) OLS 
Quantile 
0.10 
Quantile 
0.25 
Quantile 
0.50 
Quantile 
0.75 
Quantile 
0.90 
              
School Attributes:       
Average Iowa Test Percentile -0.000222 -0.000868 -0.000514 -0.000400 0.00121 0.00210 
 (0.000771) (0.00140) (0.000710) (0.000808) (0.00122) (0.00179) 
Proportion of teachers with master's degree 8.77e-05 -0.000518 3.21e-05 -0.000161 0.000399 0.00219 
 (0.000741) (0.00147) (0.000718) (0.000761) (0.000893) (0.00143) 
Average class size 0.000183 0.000738 -0.000306 -0.000312 9.27e-05 0.00192 
 (0.00139) (0.00265) (0.00142) (0.00149) (0.00168) (0.00292) 
Total number of students -3.86e-05 -0.000120 -5.43e-05 0.000151 -0.000156 -0.000263 
 (9.58e-05) (0.000187) (8.55e-05) (9.30e-05) (0.000160) (0.000242)
Proportion of black students -0.120 -0.0841 -0.0840 0.0349 -0.0786 -0.0132 
 (0.111) (0.209) (0.108) (0.113) (0.164) (0.258) 
Proportion of students with subsidized lunch -0.0921 -0.0241 -0.0152 -0.0580 0.0805 -0.450 
 (0.149) (0.271) (0.135) (0.129) (0.213) (0.417) 
Miles to school 0.0245** 0.0194 0.0121 0.00684 0.0120 0.0691* 
 (0.0122) (0.0162) (0.00825) (0.0110) (0.0215) (0.0361) 
       
Observations 274 274 274 274 274 274 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Quantile regression standard errors were bootstrapped 99 times. 
Al so controlled for days on the market, year dummies, season dummies, and listing density. 
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Figure 1 
Graphical Illustrations of Marginal Effects as Estimated by OLS and Quantile Regressions from Table 2 
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Footnotes: 
                                                 
* Author: Roy Wada, UCLA School of Public Health, Box 951772, Los Angeles, California 90095-1772, 
roywada@ucla.edu. Author: Velma Zahirovic-Herbert, Department of Housing and Consumer Economics, 
University of Georgia, 111 Dawson Hall, Athens, GA 30602-3622, vherbert@uga.edu. 
1 See Moe (1995) and Schneider and Buckley (2002) for discussions regarding the criticisms of school 
choice. See the Carnegie Foundation (1992) and Schneider et al. (2000) for evidence regarding the effect of 
non-academic factors on parent’s choice of schools.
2 See Fischel (2001), Ross and Yinger (1999), and Kane, et al. (2003) for overviews of the empirical public 
service quality and property tax capitalization literatures. Some education and labor economists suggest 
that school achievement might not be the proper measure of school quality. Instead, they suggest focusing 
on the growth in achievement scores over time as a measure of schools’ marginal contribution to 
educational outcome (Hanushek and Taylor, 1990; Hayes and Taylor, 1996; Figlio, 1999; Downes and 
Zabel, 2002; and Brasington and Haurin, 2006). 
3 OLS regression has typically been used in housing research to determine the relationship of a particular 
housing characteristic with selling price. Results differ across studies, not only in terms of size of OLS 
coefficients and statistical significance, but sometimes in the direction of effects. 
4 Quantile regression minimizes a weighted sum of the absolute deviations, 
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, where q is the quantile or percentile between 0 and 1, h(i) = 2q if 
the residual is positive and h(i)= 2 - 2q if non-positive (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 
2001). In contrast, OLS minimizes the sum of the squared residuals in the following form, 
. Hence a classical OLS regression can said to estimate conditional 
mean functions. 
5 An alternative to using quantile regression is to stratify dependent variables into subsets according to its 
unconditional distribution and then applying OLS on the subsets. Ries and Somerville (2004) show that 
after segmenting a sample into quantiles based on the price-per-square foot of housing, measures of school 
quality only affect high-end houses most likely purchased by high-income buyers. Our technique of 
estimating a conditional quantile function avoids such truncation on the dependent variable. As argued by 
Heckman (1979), truncation of the dependent variable may create biased parameter estimates. Segmenting 
the data and estimating each section of the unconditional distribution yields incorrect results (Koenker and 
Bassett, 1978).
6 An immediate withdrawal of 8,000 white students from the public school system resulted in the 
percentage of black students in the system rising from 41 percent in 1981 to 70 percent in 2000. Enrollment 
data are from Louisiana Department of Education, Annual Financial Report, various years. 
7 For example, School Superintendent Gary Mathews and the school board's desegregation expert, David 
Bartz, proposed a plan that called for 4,800 to 4,900 students to be transferred. The main idea behind 
Bartz's plan was to provide stability by getting schools far enough below their limits that zones would not 
have to be changed again immediately. At the same time, the NAACP proposed a plan that would reassign 
fewer students — about 1,900 — by raising some enrollment caps and opening a new magnet school to try 
to lure students out of overcrowded schools voluntarily. 
8 Spending differences for other district-determined school inputs are minimal because of court mandated 
equalized spending. District-reported data are obtained from the Annual School Report (ASR) produced by 
the Louisiana Department of Education. According to the Louisiana State Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education, small classes are designed to allow more time for individual pupil-teacher 
interactions. Based on this belief, the State Board has set specific limits on the maximum size of classes at 
various grade levels. 
9 It is calculated as the total number of students divided by the total number of classes for each school and 
for each school year. 
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10 Following convention, the relevant school measures are lagged one year. This ensures full exposure of 
the house seller and buyer to the school ranking at the time the property is put on the market. 
11 Another reason we include the distance measure is that the survey of school parents showed that while 
the majority of parents support the neighborhood schools, between 51 and 58 percent of parents would 
withdraw their child if reassigned to a school that is further away than a 30-minute bus ride. 
12 The marginal effect was calculated as a linear combination of estimated coefficients and the means for 
the reassignment and its interactions terms. 
13 The standard errors were bootstrapped 99 times. The results did not noticeably change from the results 
using 49 replications. 
14 Of the 274 repeat sales, 30 houses were assigned to different school due to the court-ordered 
redistricting. This is not a large enough sample size to estimate as a separate group. 
 
